AI is turning protectionists into free traders
A WTO/IMF index of restrictive trade measures rose by more than 60% in 2025, after Donald Trump called “chronic trade deficits” a national emergency, India promoted swadeshi self-sufficiency, the EU moved to double steel tariffs and Mexico approved steep levies on goods from China and other Asian economies. Yet the dollar value of world trade has surged by more than 27% since the final quarter of 2024 and was up 18% year on year in the first eight months of 2026; trade volumes are expected to outpace the world economy for a second year. Using the WTO’s classification of AI-related goods, The Economist calculates that trade in such products rose 55% in those eight months, and that AI hardware now accounts for about a quarter of world imports, up from 15% in 2023. In America, spending on computers, telecoms gear and data-centre construction amounts to 2.5% of GDP, and the Federal Reserve says that for every dollar invested in high-tech equipment the country imports roughly 90 cents’ worth. US AI-related imports are on course to exceed $1trn in 2026: they rose 69% in January-August while imports of everything else fell 10%. A Minneapolis Fed study finds that 97% of computing-hardware imports and 85% of networking-equipment imports fall into tariff-exempt categories; in 2025 America collected tariffs equivalent to less than 2% of the value of imported computing and networking kit, versus nearly 10% on goods unrelated to AI. The 25% “semiconductor tariffs” imposed in January target advanced chips such as Nvidia’s H200 heading from Taiwan to China via America, and the Congressional Research Service questions whether any of the affected chip imports would actually pay the levy, given sweeping exemptions for American data centres, startups, research and other domestic uses. The September goods deficit reached $136bn, more than 70% wider than a year earlier. America accounts for four in ten global imports of servers, computer parts and networking gear, against one in six for other goods; had AI-related imports grown only as fast as other imports, the 2025 goods deficit would have been 16%, or nearly $200bn, smaller. Six economies (Taiwan, Mexico, Vietnam, Thailand, South Korea and Malaysia) account for more than four-fifths of America’s AI imports, and Mexico and Taiwan alone supply 85% of its imports of AI servers and other computer-processing kit, though the paper notes this will include some rerouted goods. It walks through an Nvidia GB300 rack (chips designed in America, fabricated in Taiwan with Dutch lithography and German mirrors, paired with South Korean high-bandwidth memory and assembled in Mexico) and notes that even Blackwell chips now made in Arizona must still travel back to Asia to be packaged with that memory. CSIS estimates existing steel, aluminium and copper tariffs could add $130bn to America’s planned data-centre buildout by 2030, and that a blanket 25% levy on semiconductors and products containing them, which the president is considering, could add $360bn. The Economist’s argument is that a goods deficit can accompany productive investment, that free trade lets American firms specialise in chip design, AI research and software, and that labyrinthine supply chains expose the limits of reshoring. It adds that election-night polling found roughly two-thirds of midterm voters thought Trump’s levies had hurt the economy, and concludes that globalisation is proving stubborn to kill.
Why it matters
This is the paper’s own quantification of how completely the AI buildout now dominates world trade and America’s import bill, which is the physical counterpart of the capex, neocloud and chip stories Dealroom tracks. Tariff exemptions, the $1trn US AI-import run-rate and CSIS’s $130bn/$360bn cost adders are direct inputs to data-centre economics, hardware startup demand and any European or Asian supplier’s place in the Nvidia/TSMC/Mexico assembly chain.
Executive takeaways
- Reported: world trade in AI-related goods (WTO classification, Economist calculation) rose 55% in January-August 2026 year on year, and AI hardware is about a quarter of world imports, up from 15% in 2023.
- Reported: US AI-related imports rose 69% in the same period while other imports fell 10%, and are on course to exceed $1trn in 2026; high-tech equipment spending is 2.5% of GDP, with about 90 cents imported per dollar invested (Fed).
- Reported: 97% of computing-hardware and 85% of networking-equipment imports fall under tariff exemptions (Minneapolis Fed); 2025 tariff collections were under 2% of those imports’ value versus nearly 10% on non-AI goods.
- Reported: the January 25% semiconductor levy is full of holes; the Congressional Research Service questions whether any affected chip imports would actually pay it.
- Reported: the September goods deficit hit $136bn, more than 70% wider than a year earlier; without AI’s faster import growth the 2025 deficit would have been 16%, or nearly $200bn, smaller.
- Reported: Taiwan, Mexico, Vietnam, Thailand, South Korea and Malaysia supply more than four-fifths of US AI imports; Mexico and Taiwan supply 85% of AI servers and computer-processing kit (some of it possibly rerouted).
- Reported: CSIS puts existing metal tariffs at an extra $130bn on the planned data-centre buildout by 2030, and a hypothetical blanket 25% semiconductor tariff at $360bn.
- Economist view: a wider goods deficit can still mean productive capital formation; reshoring hits supply-chain limits; midterm discontent over tariffs may, but need not, slow further levies.
What The Economist may be missing
The 55%, 25% and $1trn figures all rest on the paper’s use of the WTO’s AI-goods classification, but it does not spell out what is in or out of that basket, so the numbers are hard to reproduce. It notes that some Mexico/Taiwan shipments may be rerouted Chinese content without estimating how much, which matters for any read of “de-risking”. Europe is mentioned only for steel tariffs, not for its own AI-hardware trade position or for ASML’s role beyond a passing lithography reference. Software, cloud and model services, which do not show up in the goods deficit, are left out of the current-account story, as are export controls that shape AI trade without being tariffs. The $360bn CSIS figure is explicitly hypothetical, and there is little on the political odds of a blanket semiconductor tariff after the midterms beyond one election-night poll.
